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Abstract
This article investigates the history of  Islamic 
religious authority in Indonesia and the role of the 
media in the development of religious authority 
and the imagination of  Islamic community. The 
article argues that the contestation of  Islamic 
religious authority has contributed to the process 
of re-imagination and re-conceptualisation of the 
concept of global Muslim  ummat by Muslim groups 
in Indonesia. The article also argues that the media 
play a signifi cant role in the current understanding of 
 ummat and  Islamic religious authority in the global 
and local contexts. The old traditional authority of 
local imam or  Islamic clerics is now being challenged 
by transnational interpreters of Islam with the 
availability of direct connection with  Islamic clerics 
and religious learning resources from the Middle East, 
the United States, the United Kingdom or anywhere 
else in the world facilitated by the internet.
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media; muslim
Abstrak
Artikel ini melakukan investigasi sejarah 
keagamaan Islam di Indonesia dan peran media 
Taufi qurrahman
Program Studi Ilmu Komunikasi 
Universitas  Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
Jl. Lingkar Selatan, Tamantirto, Kasihan, Bantul, Yogyakarta
Email : taufi q_rm@yahoo.com
dalam pengembangan otoritas keagamaan dan 
imajinasi masyarakat Islam. Artikel ini berpendapat 
bahwa kontestasi kekuasaan Islam telah 
memberikan kontribusi terhadap proses re-imajinasi 
dan re-konseptualisasi dari konsep umat Muslim 
global dengan kelompok Muslim di Indonesia. 
Artikel tersebut juga berpendapat bahwa media 
memainkan peran penting dalam pemahaman 
saat umat dan otoritas keagamaan Islam dalam 
konteks global dan lokal . Otoritas tradisional 
imam lokal atau ulama Islam setempat sekarang 
sedang ditantang oleh transnasional Islam dengan 
ketersediaan koneksi langsung dengan ulama Islam 
dan sumber agama yang belajar dari Timur Tengah, 
Amerika Serikat , Inggris atau di tempat lain di 
dunia dengan difasilitasi oleh internet.
Kata kunci : Islam religious;  ummat; internet; 
 new media; muslim
INTRODUCTION
The term  ummat is central in the 
imagination of the ideal form of  Islamic 
community. The article argues that the 
media play a significant role in the current 
understanding of  ummat and  Islamic religious 
authority in the global and local context. 
This article also argues that the contestation 
of  Islamic religious authority has contributed 
to the process of re-imagination and re-
conceptualisation of the idea of global Muslim 
 ummat by Muslim groups in Indonesia. The 
old traditional authority of local imam or 
 Islamic clerics is now being challenged by 
transnational interpreters of Islam with the 
availability of direct connection with  Islamic 
clerics and religious learning resources from 
the Middle East, the United States, the 
United Kingdom or anywhere else in the 
world facilitated by the internet. I start the 
article by outlining specific contribution 
of the media in the transformation of 
religious authority in Islam globally and 
more specifically in Indonesia. I then go on 
to outline two important implications of the 
transformation of  Islamic religious authority 
in Indonesia, namely the proliferation of the 
centres of authority and the change in the 
holders of authority and how these changes 
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have contributed to different imaginations of 
the  Islamic  ummat in Indonesia. 
METHOD
This article employs critical discourse 
analysis as the research method. The socio-
cognitive approach of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) developed by Teun van 
Dijk (2001) is utilised in this research.  
This approach focuses on the role of socio-
cognitive structures in mediating texts 
and society, and the complexities of the 
relationship between discourse structure 
and social structures. Several elements of 
discourse are analysed including semantic 
macrostructures and schematic structures of 
the text (topics, propositional structures), 
local meaning (choice of vocabulary, specific 
arguments), context and  event models (the 
context and facts represented in the text) 
and the relationship between the text and its 
broader social context.
CONTENT
Media and religious authority in Islam
The term religious authority has various 
meanings. Gaborieau (2010) offers a general 
definition of religious authority as ‘the 
right to impose rules which are deemed to 
be in consonance with the will of God’ (p. 
1). Furthermore, Kramer and Schmidtke 
(2006) argue that religious authority can be 
implemented in many forms and functions 
which include:
the ability (chance, power, or right) to 
define correct belief and practice, or 
orthodoxy and orthopraxy, respectively; 
to shape and influence the views and 
conduct of others accordingly; to identify, 
marginalize, punish or exclude deviance, 
heresy and apostasy and their agents and 
advocates (p. 1).
The ultimate source of authority in Islam 
is the revelation received by the Prophet 
Muhammad. Therefore, ‘any claim on 
religious authority in the following periods 
had to prove its link with this source’ (Mir-
Kasimov, 2013, p. 2). Mir-Kasinov further 
argues that despite this single source of 
authority, various approaches have been used 
by scholars in Islam to preserve or interpret 
‘the original impulse of the prophetic 
revelation’ (Mir-Kasinov, 2013, p 2).
The competition for creating Muslim 
identities goes hand in hand with the 
competition of  Islamic religious authority. 
Several studies suggest that media play an 
important role in the construction of the 
competing authorities, because religious 
authority in contemporary Muslim society is 
achieved more by popular recognition rather 
than a hierarchical system of authority (see 
for instance Anderson, 1999; Mandaville, 
2001; and Turner, 2007). The important 
role of media can be seen in the way the 
source of  Islamic authority has shifted from 
oral sources to print sources and then to 
the internet. Therefore, different media can 
be understood to endow the possibility of a 
different conception of  Islamic authority and 
also facilitate various conceptualisations of 
 Islamic community.
During the early years of  Islamic 
propagation, the sources of  Islamic teaching 
came from the prophet Muhammad and 
his companions mainly in the form of oral 
authority (see for instance Nasr, 1992 and 
Robinson 1993). Therefore, the authority to 
interpret the teaching of Islam was limited 
in the hand of the prophet Muhammad 
and scholars who had direct contact with 
him or his companions. In Indonesia, 
this Middle Eastern style of authority was 
mainly introduced by Arab traders from the 
Hadhramaut region, many of whom were 
believed to be the descendants of the prophet 
Muhammad, who finally settled in some 
parts of the archipelago and also by returning 
Indonesian pilgrims who spent their time 
in the holy city Mecca to learn Islam (van 
Bruinessen, 1999). This Middle Eastern style 
of Islam was an exception to the dominant 
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‘syncretistic’ type of Islam which represents 
‘the early wave of Islamisation’ in Indonesia 
in the 13th century to the 15th century (van 
Bruinessen, 1999, p. 3). Therefore, the 
tension between the perceived ‘global’ version 
of Islam and the culturally adaptable ‘local’ 
version of Islam in Indonesia has existed 
long before the arrival of print Islam. The 
oral tradition in  Islamic teaching was still 
very dominant until the adoption of printing 
technology in the Muslim world in the 
nineteenth century (Robinson, 1993).
In the era of print technology, written 
authority replaced the oral authority of Muslim 
scholars. The printing press started to be used 
widely in the Muslim world in the beginning of 
nineteenth century. Muslim reformist leaders in 
the Indian sub-continents started to establish 
printing presses in 1820s and Muslim rulers in 
the Ottoman empire started to print  Islamic 
books in 1870s (Robinson, 1993). By the end of 
the nineteenth century and at the beginning of 
twentieth century several global figures of  Islamic 
reform such as Muhammed Abduh (1849-1905) 
and Mowlana Mawdudi (1903-1979) were 
journalists (Anderson, 1999). In Indonesia, 
the first printed  Islamic publication was a 1853 
printing of a text recited to celebrate the birth of 
the prophet Muhammad (Proudfoot, 1995). 
This print based authority was then 
rapidly reproduced in the era of tape 
and digital recording technology by the 
massive reproduction of  Islamic speeches 
and books into audio and video cassettes 
and also compact discs, especially after 
the introduction of optical media in 1980s 
(Mandaville, 2001). Audio and video 
recording technology might have facilitated 
the partial return of the power of oral 
authority. However, this recording technology 
can not resemble the intimate connection 
which can be established between the teacher 
and the students in the era of oral authority.
The use of printing technology and digital 
recording technology in the global Muslim 
world had reduced the dominant role of 
oral authority of Muslim scholars and made 
 Islamic books and other references more 
accessible to ordinary Muslims. Although 
a printing press has been established by 
Jewish refugee in Istanbul to print Bibles and 
secular books since 1493, the Muslim rulers 
were initially reluctant to adopt printing 
technology for the purpose of  Islamic teaching 
(Robinson, 1993). According to Robinson, 
the reason behind this rejection was mainly 
because rulers feared that printing technology 
would threatens the oral tradition which had 
become ‘the very heart of  Islamic systems for 
the transmission of knowledge’ (Robinson, 
1993, p. 234). Robinson further argues that:   
By printing the  Islamic classics, and the 
print run for a major text could be as 
many as ten thousand copies, and by 
translating them into the vernaculars they 
undermined their authority; they [ Islamic 
clerics] were no longer necessarily around 
when the book was read to make up for 
the absence of the author in the text; their 
precious ijazas (certificates), which brought 
the authority of the past to their learning 
in the present, were made less significant; 
their monopoly of the transmission of 
knowledge was broken (Robinson, 1993, p. 
245).
Robinson’s statement about the absence 
of author in the era of print industry echoes 
McLuhan’s idea in his book ‘The Gutenberg 
Galaxy’ that the arrival of print technology 
has created the ‘autonomous survival of 
knowledge’. In a review of ‘The Gutenberg 
Galaxy’ Mizrach argues that: 
The spoken word is intimate, tied to the 
very breath and health of the speaker. 
The written word makes possible the 
autonomous survival of knowledge - with 
an oral tradition, it disappears when 
the oralists have all been killed; but, as 
people have noted for a long time, writing 
is impersonal, does not carry emotional 
intonations as well as speech, and lacks 
the identifying characteristics (pitch, tone, 




Proudfoot further argues that the use of 
printing technology in the dissemination of 
 Islamic teaching has democratised the access 
to  Islamic texts but at the same time has also 
facilitated the rise of standardised ‘orthodox 
Muslim learning’. The rise of this ‘orthodox 
understanding’ was mainly influenced by the 
easier access of ordinary Muslims to many 
classic ‘authoritative texts’, they were ‘less 
reliant on mediation by ulama’ (Proudfoot, 
1995, p. 220). 
The internet has enabled further 
proliferation of sources of authorithy. The 
convivial characteristics, especially the user 
friendliness and the power of multimodality 
offered by the internet have facilitated the 
existence of new interpreters of Islam and 
new ways of imagining the concept of  ummat 
(see for instance Eickelman and Anderson, 
1999; Saunders, 2008; Sands, 2010). These 
new interpreters come from diasporic Muslim 
communities which geographically reside in 
many different parts of the world with various 
social and political situations. As Turner 
argues: 
For Islam and many other cultures, 
globalization has meant migration 
followed by the creation of diasporic 
communities. The internet provides an 
obvious method for dialogue within and 
between such diasporic groups, but the 
unintended consequence is often that 
diasporic politics and their intellectual 
elites come to depart radically from 
tradition, building up their own internal 
notions of authority, authenticity and 
continuity. The Internet holds the 
diasporic community together across space 
and then challenges traditional authority, 
which is characteristically an oral and print 
authority (Turner, 2007, p. 127).
The transmission of  Islamic teaching 
which initially relied on the oral and personal 
authority of Muslim scholars who have direct 
contact with the prophet Muhammad and 
his companions has been challenged by the 
impersonal authority of print media and has 
also been increasingly disjointed from the 
traditional authorities by the global use of the 
internet by Muslim communities all over the 
world (Mandaville, 2001; Turner, 2007).   
Local implications in Indonesia
As discussed above, the nature of  Islamic 
religious authority has changed over time, 
in part corresponding to the changing media 
technologies. Here I turn specifically to 
analysing two aspects of  Islamic authority in 
Indonesia, namely geopolitical spaces from 
which authority emanates and persons in 
whom authority is vested.
Proliferation of centres of authority
The development of Muslim religious 
authority can particularly be seen in the 
tradition of fatwa (Fatwa is the delivery 
religious opinion on specific issues related to 
everyday life of Muslim. The authoritative 
person in giving the fatwa is called a 
Mufti). Since the introduction of Islam 
in Indonesia until the end of nineteenth 
century, Indonesian Muslims relied on the 
religious opinion of the Muslim scholars 
in the holy city Mecca such as the great 
Meccan mufti Ahmad Dahlan (d. 1886) 
(Kaptein, 2004). Until the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the holy cities Mecca and 
also Medina were still regarded as the centre 
for the development of Islam by Indonesian 
(Bruinessen, 1999). Bruinessen further argues 
that the connection to the holy cities Mecca 
and Medina was mainly introduced by many 
Arab traders and the returning Indonesian 
pilgrims (hajj) and students from the holy 
cities Mecca and Medina back to the  Islamic 
‘periphery’ of Indonesia (1999, p. 6). 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, 
the central position of Mecca has been 
challenged by the rise of several modernist 
Muslim scholars from Cairo followed by the 
expansion of the brotherhood movement 
from Egypt. Several other centres also started 
to bring their influence to Indonesia such 
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as the Ahmadiyya movement from Pakistan 
and also significant influence from Iran after 
the  Islamic revolution (van Bruinessen, 
1999). The emergence of the  Salafi Jihadi 
movement in Afghanistan since the early 
1980s introduced jihad battlefields in many 
countries as a new centre of influence. Van 
Bruinessen further argues that the centre-
periphery model was no longer adequate 
to describe the development of Islam in 
Indonesia at the end of twentieth century. 
He instead describes the new formation as a 
network model.  
By the 1970s, however, there were not 
only more centres, but the influences had 
also become more diffuse, and a network 
model represents the flow of influences 
more adequately. One did not have to 
go to Mecca or Cairo to find stimulating 
 Islamic ideas. Students of medicine or 
political science at an American university 
were as likely to emphasise their Muslim 
identities and to encounter fascinating 
new  Islamic thought. Journals and books, 
in such international languages as English 
and Arabic or in Indonesian translations, 
became the major vehicles of  Islamic 
dissemination (van Bruinessen, 1999, p.  
11).
The use of the internet in the 
representation of Islam and  Islamic teaching 
propagation in Indonesia has clearly made the 
flow of influences even more complex. Many 
independent interpreters of Islam have started 
to emerge and these new interpreters have 
contributed to the change of the way  Islamic 
religious authority operates. 
Holders of religious authority
Traditionally, a fatwa is given by an 
individual mufti. However, since the beginning 
of twentieth century, Muslim organisations 
in Indonesia have started to introduce 
‘collective religious opinions’ in response 
to the particular problems of Indonesian 
Muslims (Hosen, 2008; Kaptein 2004). Many 
 Islamic print media with various forms such 
as newspapers, bulletins and magazines have 
also provided a special section to answer the 
questions about any religious issues from the 
readers in the Indonesian context. Within 
this framework, the authoritative power 
of an individual mufti is usually achieved 
more by the charismatic authority of the 
individual mufti based on the description of 
the three types of authority introduced by 
Max Weber (Max Weber introduces three 
different types of authority; namely traditional 
authority, charismatic authority and legal-
rational authority. Traditional authority is 
maintained by constant reference to customs, 
traditions and conventions; Charismatic 
authority is maintained by strong personality 
of the leaders; And legal-rational authority 
is empowered by a formalistic belief in the 
content of the law or rationality (see for 
instance Best, 2002 and Williams, 2003). On 
the other hand, the collective authority of 
Muslim groups and organisations has been 
developed mainly in the form of traditional 
and legal-rational types of authority. The 
significant role of charismatic authority was 
threatened by the impersonal authority of 
print media but potentially re-emerged in the 
competition of  Islamic religious authority in 
various audio-visual media outlets, especially 
the internet, because the internet provides 
the possibility of the use of multimodal 
communication by combining written, 
audio and visual messages in one  place. 
In her research on the use of multimodal 
communication by Muslims on the internet, 
Sands argues,
…although some Muslims speak the 
“language” of older forms of media, 
transferred to the Web, many are 
“linguistically” adept in exploiting the 
multiple linkages of  online spaces and the 
particular vernacular spoken in this new 
medium, a mix of written text, imagery 
and sound (Sands, 2010, p. 154).         
There has been also a change in the 
background of the holders of religious 
authority. Until the first half of twentieth 
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century, Muslim religious authority in 
Indonesia was mainly in the hands of 
traditional clerical scholars who graduated 
from the Middle East or their students in 
local traditional  Islamic schools in Indonesia. 
These Middle Eastern graduate scholars 
tended to promote a more literal approach to 
the study of  Islamic law in Indonesia (Bowen, 
2011). Since the late 1960s many Indonesian 
Muslim intellectuals have been sent to 
pursue their studies in western countries 
especially the United States and Canada. 
This different route of ‘intellectual pilgrimage’ 
has contributed to the development of an 
alternative approach to the study of  Islamic 
law in Indonesia by introducing ‘a social-
contextual approach to  Islamic history’ and ‘a 
more universalistic liberal approach grounded 
in human rights norms’  (Bowen, 2011: 49). 
These Muslim intellectuals with western 
educational backgrounds started to bring an 
influence after the arrival of several influential 
Muslim scholars from their study in 1980s. 
One of the most prominent was Nurcholish 
Madjid (1939-2005) who holds a PhD degree 
from the University of Chicago. He promoted 
the idea of so called ‘ Islamic Indonesian-ness’, 
a genuine identity of Islam in Indonesia which 
is in harmony with Pancasila as the basis of 
the Indonesian nation state (van Bruinessen, 
1999). 
The idea of Islam and Indonesian-
ness (Islam dan keindonesiaan) brought 
by Nurcholis Madjid and his renewal 
(pembaharuan) group is in line with the idea 
of ‘indigenisation of Islam’ (pribumisasi Islam) 
introduced by another influential Muslim 
scholar from the traditionalist background, 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Burhani, 2013, p. 27). 
According to Burhani (2013), this integrated 
description of  Islamic identity and national 
identity has become a central issue in the 
mainstream Muslim groups in Indonesia 
since the middle of the New Order era. Azra 
identifies these mainstream groups as ‘non 
political, operating not only as religious 
organisations but also as social, cultural and 
educational organisations’ (Azra, 2013, p. 
70). Furthermore, van Bruinessen (2008) 
differentiates mainstream Muslim groups in 
Indonesia into two categories, namely the 
traditionalists who maintain syncretistic 
practices found in early Islamisation in 
Indonesia (such as  Nahdhatul Ulama) and 
the reformists (other scholars use the term 
modernists) who criticise those practices 
based on the argument that there is no 
justification of those practices in the Qur’an 
and the prophetic traditions (such as Al-
Irsyad,  Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam). 
Burhani (2013) further argues that although 
the concept of Indonesian Islam has been 
intrepreted differently by the traditionalist 
and the modernist/reformist Muslim groups, 
the concept has been used by both of the 
mainstream Muslim groups in Indonesia to 
define their distict identities. He contends:
For traditionalist Muslims, the concept 
(Indonesian Islam) reflects the efforts to 
define what is authentic in Indonesian 
Islam and to avoid a blind imitation of 
foreign influences…In modernist circles, 
Indonesian Islam is mainly used to solve 
the problems surounding the relation 
between religion and state (Burhani, 2013, 
p. 27).
The effort of these mainstream groups 
to develop an authentic Indonesian Islam 
identity is parallel with the centralistic policy 
of the New Order regime which had already 
established a media system that allowed it 
to define and control a range of national 
discourses and to make itself the source of 
all authority in and about Indonesia (See 
for instance McDaniel, 2002; Sen and Hill, 
2007). Media regulation during the Soeharto 
era was very tight. All media which expressed 
oppositional voices towards Soeharto were 
banned. Bourchier (2015) argues that ‘in 
Soeharto’s ‘Pancasila Democracy’, opposition 
and conflict were condemned as alien 
notions, deriving from individualistic western 
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culture’ (p. 2). The idea of Indonesian Islam 
was supported by the New Order regime 
arguably because it was considered to be 
more relevant in the context of Indonesian 
nation building and it did not contradict the 
interests of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. 
After the fall of Soeharto’s regime, the idea 
of indigenous Indonesian Islam which is 
compatible with democracy and Pancasila still 
remains a dominant understanding of Islam in 
Indonesia. 
However, as a result of the freedom of 
information policy put in  place after the fall 
of Soeharto, transnational Islamist elements 
have had far greater access to Indonesia’s 
public spheres. Several Muslim clerics who 
were previously marginalised by Soeharto’s 
regime such as Jafar Umar Thalib and Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir and the proponents of the 
establishment of  Islamic state in Indonesia are 
currently enjoying the freedom of expression 
in Indonesian public spheres and developed 
a counter-discourse against the mainstream 
understanding of indigenous Indonesian 
Islam (Hefner, 1999). The free and open 
media policy after the New Order era has 
strengthened the network model of the 
development of  Islamic authority in Indonesia 
introduced by van Bruinessen (1999) and 
has also facilitated more diverse global 
influences to Indonesian Islam. These new 
global influences were mainly introduced by 
transnational and political  Islamic movement 
such as  Hizbut Tahrir and  Salafi Jihadi 
movement (see for instance Platzdasch, 2009 
and Solahudin 2011).
Different imaginations of  ummat in 
Indonesia
Previous studies suggest that the 
establishment of diasporic Muslim 
communities in many parts of the world and 
the proliferation of different  Islamic religious 
authorities contribute to the polarisation of 
Muslim communities across the globe. This 
polarisation has also contributed to various 
imaginations of the ideal form of Muslim 
 ummat (See for instance Mandaville, 2001; 
Roy, 2004). In his book titled Transnational 
Muslim Politics, Mandaville argues:
When I speak of reimagining the umma, 
I am talking about more than Muslims 
simply stressing their similarities, de-
emphasising their differences and living 
together in a single global community. 
Rather, I am speaking about Muslims 
reconceptualising the umma; that is revising 
their idea about who, what and where 
political community can be (Mandaville, 
2001, p. 187).
Roy echoes Mandaville’s argument that 
the contemporary  ummat can be imagined 
in many different ways. He argues that in 
the context of  Islamic neo-fundamentalist 
movement:
This imagined ummah can be expressed 
in historical paradigms (the Ottoman 
Empire), in political myth (the Caliphate), 
in legal Muslim categories (Dar-ul-Harb 
and Dar-ul-Islam) or in modern anti-US 
rhetoric (anti-imperialism), but it has 
never fitted with a given territory (Roy, 
2004, p. 288).
Although all Muslims talk about  ummat 
as the symbol of global Muslim solidarity, it is 
clear that many Muslims have different ideas 
about who can be regarded as a member of 
the  ummat and how this  ummat should be 
organised. 
Despite the fact that Pancasila as the 
foundation of the state only mentions belief 
in one god in general and does not indicate 
Islam as the official religion of the state, Islam 
has been regarded by scholars and political 
leaders as one of the strongest bonding 
elements of Indonesian nationalism. As 
Vandenbosch argues:
For a country like Indonesia, divided over 
a large number of widely separated islands, 
and with its peoples strongly attached to 
their ethnological and adat communities, 
a unifying and integrating force was 
desperately needed. The one common 
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factor of Indonesian life was Islam. Here 
was a force that could be used to break 
down local patriotisms and help create 
national unity (1952, p. 182).
However, there are many different ways 
in which Muslim groups in Indonesian define 
the position of  ummat within the discourse 
of national unity. Muhammad Ali (2011) 
identifies four different views with regard 
the relationship between Islam and national 
identity in Indonesia. First, those who declare 
‘Islamization yes, Indonesianization no’; Second, 
those who declare ‘Islam first, Indonesia second’; 
Third, those who declare ‘Formalistic Islam 
no, substantive Islam and Indonesia, yes’; 
and fourth, those who declare ‘Islamization 
yes, Indonesianization yes’ (pp. 2-8). The first 
category represents the view of transnational 
 Islamic organisations such as  Hizbut Tahrir, 
which consistently promote the re-establishment 
of global  Islamic caliphate. The second category 
represents the view of Islamist political parties 
such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), which 
prefer to participate in a democratic political 
process to promote the formalisation of  Islamic 
law in Indonesia. The third category represents 
the view of the so called ‘progressive’ Muslim 
groups such as Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), which 
promote the adoption of substantive  Islamic 
values as part of the nation identity and reject 
the formalisation of  Islamic law in Indonesia. 
The fourth category represents the view of 
‘mainstream’  Islamic organisations in Indonesia 
such as  Muhammadiyah and  Nahdhatul Ulama, 
which promote an integrated construction of 
 Islamic identity and national identity as discussed 
earlier in this article (Ali, 2011). According to 
Pringle, the identification of  Muhammadiyah 
(founded in 1912) and  Nahdhatul Ulama 
(founded in 1926) as the representation of 
mainstream Islam in Indonesia is based on two 
notions:
First, that the two organizations, although 
far from homogeneous themselves, 
represent collectively the view of most 
Indonesian Muslims, and second, that 
their views are predominantly middle-of-
the road in both religious doctrine and 
politics (Pringle, 2010, p. 115).
As a result of this understanding, these 
mainstream groups are usually associated 
with their ‘moderate’ approach of religious 
thinking and practice. 
There is no single description about the 
term moderate Muslims. It is an ambiguous 
term which is ‘understood differently by 
different people’ (Fuller, 2007, p. 34). 
Therefore the description of moderate 
Muslims will depend on ‘the politics or 
religious positions of the individual making 
the judgements’ (Esposito, 2007, p. 26). For 
instance, Bokhari and Senzai identify at least 
four different groups of Muslims who claimed 
themselves as moderate Muslims, namely 
‘moderate Islamists’, ‘traditional Muslims’, 
‘liberal Muslims’ and certain regimes in the 
Muslim World. They further explain that:
moderate Islamists claim the mantle of 
moderate Islam in a bid to distinguish 
themselves from the radical and militant 
types. Traditional Muslims who are 
different from the moderate Islamists in 
that they do not advance a particular 
political ideology based on Islam are 
quick to point out that they have always 
constituted the majority of Muslims 
historically. They emphasize that they 
gained their status as the historical 
mainstream of Islam by refraining from 
adopting any immoderate tendencies 
to advance their cause. Most practicing 
Muslims (a great many of whom perhaps 
identify with the Sufi strand of Islam) fall 
in this category. Liberal Muslims represent 
the third group: those who might adhere 
to a certain minimalist degree of personal 
religious commitment but for the most 
part have embraced secularity in the public 
realm (Bokhari and Senzai, 2007, p. 143).
Esposito argues that the basic characters of 
moderate Muslims are ‘those who live and work 
‘within’ societies, seek change from below, reject 
religious extremism, and consider violence and 
terrorism to be illegitimate’ (Esposito, 2007, p. 
26). A prominent scholar of  Muhammadiyah, 
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Syafiq A. Mughni, contends that there are 
several characteristics of moderate Muslims. 
Firstly, they consistently take the middle path 
in interpreting and implementing the teaching 
of Islam. Secondly, they are more concerned 
with the implementation of the justice system 
rather than the form of the state. Therefore 
any form of state is acceptable as long as it does 
not contradict  Islamic principles of human 
rights. Thirdly, moderate Muslims acknowledge 
contextual understanding of  Islamic law in 
connecting  Islamic values with modernity. 
Fourthly, they believe in peaceful and gradual 
change in establishing a better  Islamic society 
(Mughni, 2009). 
As the representation of mainstream 
and moderate Muslim groups in Indonesia, 
both  Muhammadiyah and  Nahdhatul Ulama 
established branches from the provincial level 
to the sub-district level in almost all parts 
of Indonesia. The precise numbers of the 
followers of  Muhammadiyah and  Nahdhatul 
Ulama are not available, but their combined 
following is estimated around a quarter of 
the Indonesian population (Pringle, 2010). 
A nation-wide survey conducted by The 
Research Center for the Study of Islam and 
Society in 2002 showed that 75% of Muslims 
in Indonesia indicated a connection with 
either  Muhammadiyah or  Nahdhatul Ulama 
(Mujani and Liddle, 2004).   Muhammadiyah’s 
view of national identity can be observed 
in the official statement declared in its 46th 
national congress in 2010 to commemorate 
the centennial anniversary of the organisation 
as follows:
In the context of nationality,  Muhammadiyah 
has sought to integrate Islam and 
‘Indonesianess’ from the beginning. 
 Muhammadiyah and the Muslim  ummat are 
the integral parts of the nation and they have 
participated in the development of Indonesia 
since the national awakening movement 
to the independence.  Muhammadiyah has 
actively participated in the establishment of 
the foundation of a nation-state based on 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. [Dalam 
kehidupan kebangsaan  Muhammadiyah 
sejak awal berjuang untuk pengintegrasian 
keislaman dan keindonesiaan. Bahwa 
 Muhammadiyah dan umat Islam merupakan 
bagian integral dari bangsa dan telah 
berkiprah dalam membangun Indonesia 
sejak pergerakan kebangkitan nasional 
hingga era kemerdekaan.  Muhammadiyah 
terlibat aktif dalam peletakan dan penentuan 
fondasi negara-bangsa yang berdasar 
Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945] 
( Muhammadiyah, 2010, p. 17) (Unless 
otherwise indicated, translations from 
Indonesian primary and secondary sources 
are mine). 
 Nahdhatul Ulama’s view can be observed in 
a statement published on its official website as 
follows:
 The ideas of  Islamic-ness and 
archipelagic-ness have fused tightly. Islam 
has become the primary binding agent 
when the archipelagic-ness transformed 
into Indonesianess as a nation-state, 
because Islam since that time has had 
an Indonesian face which has developed 
together with Indonesian culture. NU 
and the traditional boarding schools have 
played an important role in the creation 
of Indonesia as an  Islamic nation. Prior 
to independence, NU has embraced the 
concept of nationality. Although at that 
time it was called the Dutch Indies, in 
the national congress in Banjarmasin, NU 
declared that defending the sovereignty 
of the nation in the Dutch Indies is 
compulsory, because it did not mean 
defending the Dutch but defending 
the existence of the nation within the 
Dutch colonial rule. [Keislaman dengan 
kenusantaraan telah melebur sebegitu 
erat, sehingga ketika kenusantaraan 
menjadi keindonesiaan sebagai sebuah 
negara bangsa, maka keislaman menjadi 
perekat utamanya, karena Islam pada 
waktu itu sudah berwajah Indonesia, 
tumbuh dan berkembang bersama 
kebudayaan Indonesia. Penciptaan 
Indonesia sebagai sebuah bangsa Islam 
dan khususnya Islam NU dan pesantren 
memiliki andil besar. Sejak sebelum 
kemerdekaan NU telah berpegang 
pada konsep kebangsaan. Walaupun 
pada  waktu itu namanya masih Hindia 
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Belanda, tetapi NU dalam Muktamar 
Banjarmasin telah mengeluarkan sikap, 
bahwa mempertahankan kedaulatan 
bangsa yang ada di Hindia belanda itu  
merupakan kewajiban. Sebab yang hendak 
dipertahankan bukan pemerintahan 
Belanda, melainkan eksistensi bangsa yang 
ada di dalamnya] (NU Online, 2004).
In these statements, both  Muhammadiyah and 
 Nahdhatul Ulama clearly indicate an imagination 
of an integrated construction of  ummat in 
Indonesia as a combination of  Islamic and 
national awareness. 
In the aftermath of the September 11 
tragedy, the description of moderate Muslims is 
increasingly used in contradiction to the term 
radical Muslims. The polarisation between 
the ‘moderate’ and the ‘radical’ is problematic 
because not all Muslims in the radical category 
support terrorism and the use of violence to 
achieve their goals (Barton, 2004). The term 
‘radical Muslim’ is also interpreted differently by 
many scholars in  Islamic studies. Fealy proposes a 
general description of radical Muslim as follows: 
Radical Islam seeks dramatic change in 
society and the state by the unstinting 
implementation of shari’a ( Islamic law) 
and the upholding of  Islamic principles. 
Radical Muslims tend to have a strictly 
literal interpretation of the Qur’an, 
especially those sections relating to social 
relations, religious behaviour and the 
punishment of crimes, and also seek to 
adhere closely to the normative model 
based on the example of the Prophet 
Muhammad (known as the Sunnah) 
(Fealy, 2005, p. 12).
Based on this description, Fealy identifies four 
categories of radical Muslim groups, in Indonesia. 
First, non-violent political, educational and 
intellectual groups which include non-violent 
political groups such as  Hizbut Tahrir and 
non-political  Salafi study groups; Second, 
vigilante groups which have main agenda to 
stop prostitution, gambling and other ‘sinful 
activities’ such as The  Islamic Defenders’ Front 
(Front Pembela Islam—FPI); Third, paramilitary 
groups such as  Laskar Jihad and other ‘fighting 
units’ created by radical Muslim groups; Fourth, 
terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). 
(Fealy, 2005, p. 13).
Another important term which can be used 
to describe ‘radical’  Islamic groups which have 
political orientation to achieve formalisation of 
 Islamic law is Islamism. According to Barton 
‘Islamism is a response to modernity that has 
transformed the religion of Islam into political 
ideology’ (Barton, 2004, p. 29). Current studies 
on Islamism generally define Islamists as Muslim 
groups or organisations which promote the 
idea of the formalisation of  Islamic law. This 
formalisation may be variously pursued with 
strategies ranging from the partial inclusion of 
 Islamic law in the constitutions or regulations 
of governments in the local and national level, 
to the establishment of  Islamic states or the 
establishment of a global  Islamic caliphate (See 
for instance, Platzdasch, 2009 and Hilmy, 2010).
The term ‘salafi’ is also highly contested. The 
term is commonly used to claim the ‘ambition’ to 
return to the so called ‘pure Islam’ as ‘practiced 
by the  Salaf al-Shalih (pious ancestors)’, namely 
the first three generations of the followers of 
the prophet Muhammad. The dominant  Salafi 
movement tends to adopt ‘a stance of political 
quietism’ with the main concern to purify Islam 
‘for a revival of strict religious practice that 
would develop and guard the moral integrity 
of individuals’ (Hasan, 2006: 31). They focus 
their activities on peaceful  Islamic propagation 
through the mosques,  Islamic schools and other 
types of educational institutions. In Indonesia, 
the idea of salafism is mainly introduced in 
various educational institutions such as  Islamic 
schools and Arabic learning centres which 
receive funding from the government of Saudi 
Arabia or private institutions in Saudi Arabia 
(Chaplin, 2014). The  Salafi Jihadi category is a 
small faction of global and transnational  Salafi 
movement which has a political orientation to 
restore the existence of transnational  Islamic 
caliphate by promoting militaristic Jihad as the 
instrument to achieve the power. 
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CONCLUSION
The media with their distinct characteristics 
have specifically played an important role in 
the shift from the personal oral authority to 
the impersonal print authority and finally to 
the multimodal authority in the era of the 
internet.  Islamic religious authority in Indonesia 
has transformed from the traditional ‘centre-
periphery’ model to the more complex ‘network’ 
model. The old centre-periphery relations model 
between the holy city Mecca as the centre and 
Indonesia as one of the peripheries has been 
challenged by the proliferation of various centres 
of  Islamic religious authority. This proliferation 
is mainly facilitated by the collapsed of the New 
Order authoritarian regime, higher mobility 
of Muslim scholars and the development of 
information and communication technology. 
This proliferation of religious authority has 
facilitated many different ways of imagining 
or re-imagining the  ummat as the vision of 
Muslims. 
REFERENCES
Ali, M. 2011. Islam dan keindonesiaan: Merajut 
kebhinekaan dalam keikaan dalam rangka pendidikan 
karakter bangsa. Paper presented in Interdisclipinary 
Colloqium in STAIN Salatiga, Indonesia, 30 November 
2011. Retrieved 5 December 2014 from https://www.
academia.edu/3709159/Islam_dan_Keindonesiaan
Anderson, J. 1999. The internet and Islam’s new 
interpreters. In J. Anderson New media in the Muslim 
world: The emerging public sphere. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. pp. 41--55.
Azra, A. 2013. Distinguishing Indonesian Islam: Some 
lessons to learn. In Jajat Burhanudin and Kees Van 
Dijk (Eds.) Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting images and 
representations, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press.
Barton, G. 2004. Indonesia’s struggle: Jamaah Islamiyah 
and the soul of Islam. Sydney: UNSW Press.
Best, S. 2002. Introduction to Politics and Society. 
London: Sage Publications.
Bokhari, K.A. & Senzai, F. 2007. Defi ning a moderate. 
In M.A.M. Khan (Ed.) Debating moderate Islam: 
The geopolitics of Islam and the West. Salt Lake 
City: The University of Utah Press.  
Bourchier, D. 2015. Illiberal democracy in Indonesia: 
The ideology of the family state. London: 
Routledge.
Bowen, J.R. 2011. Intellectual pilgrimages and local 
norms in fashioning Indonesian Islam. Revue des 
Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée, (123), 37.
Burhani, A.N. 2013. Defi ning Indonesian Islam: An 
examination of the construction of national  Islamic 
identity of traditionalist and modernist Muslims. In 
Jajat Burhanudin and Kees Van Dijk (eds) Islam in 
Indonesia: Contrasting images and representations, 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Chaplin, C. 2014. Imagining the land of the two holy 
mosques: The social and doctrinal importance of 
Saudi Arabia in Indonesian  Salafi  discourse. Austrian 
Journal of South-East Asian Studies. 7 (2), 217--236.
Eickelman, D.F. & Anderson, J.W. 1999. New media 
in the Muslim world: the emerging public sphere. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press
Esposito, J.L. 2007. A mainstream of modernists, 
Islamists, conservatives, and traditionalists, in 
M.A.M. Khan (Ed.) Debating moderate Islam: The 
geopolitics of Islam and the West. Salt Lake City: 
The University of Utah Press.
Fealy, G. 2005. Radical Islam in Indonesia: History, 
ideology and prospects. In ASPI Local jihad: 




Gaborieau, M. 2010. The redefi nition of religious 
authority among South Asian Muslims from 
1919 to 1956. In Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk 
and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds.) Varieties of religious 
authority: Changes and challenges in 20th century 
Indonesian Islam. Singapore: ISEAS.
Hasan, N. 2006.  Laskar Jihad: Islam, militancy, and 
the quest for identity in Post-New Order Indonesia. 
Ithaca: Cornel University Press.
Hefner, R.W. 1999. Civic pluralism denied? The  new 
media and jihadi violence in Indonesia. In D.F. 
Eickelman & J.W. Anderson (Eds.) New media in the 
Muslim world. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Hilmi, M. 2010. Islamism and democracy in Indonesia 




Hosen, N. 2008. Online fatwa in Indonesia: From fatwa 
shopping to googling a kiai. In G. Fealy and S. White 
(Eds.) Expressing islam: Religious life and politics in 
Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies.
Kaptein, N. J.G. 2004. The voice of the ‘Ulama’: Fatwas 
and religious authority in Indonesia. Archives de 
sciences sociales des religions EHESS. No 125. pp 
115--130.
Kramer, G & Schmidtke, S. 2006. Introduction: 
Religious authority and religious authorities in 
Muslim societies. A critical overview. In Gudrun 
Kramer & Sabine Schidtke (eds) Speaking for 
Islam: Religious authorities in Muslim societies. 
Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. 
Mandaville, M. 2001. Transnational Muslim politics: 
Reimagining the umma. London: Routledge.
McDaniel, D. 2002. Electronic tigers of Southeast Asia: 
The politics of media, technology, and national 
development. Iowa: Iowa State University Press.
Mir-Kasimov, O. 2013. Unity in diversity: Mysticism, 
Messianism and the construction of religious 
authority in Islam. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.
Mizrach, S. n.d.. The hidden center of the “Gutenberg 
Galaxy”. Retrieved 14 April 2014 from http://
www2.fi u.edu/~mizrachs/Gutenberg_Galaxy.html.
Mughni, S. A. 2009. Role of Indonesian moderate 
Muslim in facing global challenges. Paper 
presented at Indonesian-Austrian Symposium, 
Diplomatic Academy, 27--29 May 2009.
 Muhammadiyah. 2010. Tanfidz keputusan 
muktamar satu abad  Muhammadiyah. 




Mujani, S., & Liddle, R. W. 2004. Politics, Islam and 
Public Opinion. Journal of Democracy. 15 (1). pp 
109-123.
Nasr, S.H. 1992. Oral transmission and the book in 
 Islamic education: The spoken and the written 
word. Journal of  Islamic Studies. 3 (1), 1-14.
NU Online. 2004. Perongrong paham kebangsaan. 




Nuraendi, Asri., Mentari, Rona. 2013. Komodifikasi 
Dai di Televisi: Kajian Ekonomi Politik Media. Jurnal 
Komunikator, 5(2): 72-82.
Platzdasch, B. 2009. Islamism in Indonesia : Politics in 
the emerging democracy. Singapore : Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies.
Pringle, R. 2010. Understanding Islam in Indonesia: 
Politics and diversity, Honolulu: University of Hawai’I 
Press.
Proudfoot, I. 1995. Early Muslim printing in Southeast 
Asia. Libri. 45, 216--223.
Robinson, F. 1993. Technology and Religious Change: 
Islam and the impact of print. Modern Asian Studies. 
27 (1), 229-251.
Roy, O. 2004. Globalized Islam: The search for a new 
ummah. New York: Columbia University Press.
Sands, K.Z. 2010. Muslims, identity and multimodal 
communication on the internet. Contemporary Islam, 
4 (1), 139-155. 
Saunders, R.A. 2008. The ummah as nation: A 
reappraisal in the wake of the ‘Cartoons Affair’, 
Nations and Nationalism. 14(2), 303--321.
Sen, K. & Hill, D.T. 2007. Media, culture and politics in 
Indonesia. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing.
Solahudin. 2011. NII sampai JI: Salafy jihadisme di 
Indonesia, Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu.
Turner, B. S. 2007. Religious authority and the  new 
media. Theory, Culture and Society. 24(2).
van Bruinessen, M. 1999. Global and local Islam in 
Indonesia. Southeast Asian Studies (Kyoto) vol. 37 (2), 
46--63.
van Bruinessen, M. 2008. Traditionalist and Islamist 
pesantrens in contemporary Indonesia. In F.A. Noor, 
Y. Srikand & M. van Bruinessen (Eds.) The madrasa 
in Asia: Political activism and transnational linkages, 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Vandenbosch, A. 1952. Nationalism and religion in 
Indonesia. Far Eastern Survey, 21 (18).
van Dijk, T. A. 2001. Multidisciplinary CDA: A plea for 
diversity. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of 
critical discourse analysis, London: Sage Publications.
Williams, D. 2003. Max Weber: Traditional, Legal-
Rational and Charismatic Authority. Retrieved 14 
April 2014 from : http://danawilliams2.tripod.com/
authority.html. 
